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Z« Generic Congestion Customary Congestion and Pollution
Increasing popular and professional attention is being given to two types
of phenomena characterized by substantial externalities—urban congestion and
environmental pollution. Both represent the unkind rub of human activities on
one another, where there is no intermediation of a market to enable affected
parties to confront their tormentors. Examination of the phenomena reveals that
they have much in common beyond the sheer fact of externalities. The structure
of the externalities is similar, and an exploitation of this similarity throws
light on why they are both becoming critical problems in our society, what their
consequences are, and what kinds of measures can be used to mitigate their damage.
In the present paper we propose to treat congestion and pollution oroblems
as members of a single class, integrating the distinctive characteristics of the
tsdo together as aspects of one phenomenon. We shall first discuss the nature
of this more abstract configuration of socio-economic interaction, and then
display its ramifications in a mathematical model which treats both positive
and normative considerations.
Highway traffic jams, queues, crowding of beaches and parks and museums,
and air and water and noise oolluticn are all forms of social congestion. Cortmon
1. The illuminating works of Allen V. Kneese en environmental pollution, as for
example his, "Air Pollution—General Background and Sane Eccnomic Prospects," chapter
in Ilarold Wblozin (ed.) The Eiconauics of Air Pollution , Norton (17.Y. , 1966), p. 34,
recognize this similarity.
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to all of them is that more than one agent are attempting to share a type
of service that is not furnished in a separable unit earmarked for each user.
Ihey are consuming in common form a "public good"—Aether it be a highway
or beach or volume of air or a water-course. In all, the presence of other
users adversely affects the quality of services which that public good renders to
each. Quality deterioration may be revealed in terms of the length of time,
safety or psychological tension of an auto trip, the size of available area
of picnic or swim space, the level of aesthetic disfigurement of a setting by
litter or noise, the degree of obstructedness or average viewing time, of paintings,
the amount of eye and lung or ear irritation in the air, or the odor, taste,
bacterial count or fish population in a body of water. In all of these, moreover,
quality deterioration dees not set in as soon as more than one user attempt
to share the public good in question. Depending on the nature of the public
good, a differing but rather wide range of users may he accommodated with no
perceivable deterioration of quality. Eadh good lias a "caoacity", or threshold,
beyond which interference Effects first become noticeable and then increase
disproportionately. Finally, while some part of the "capacity" of the public
good may be natural, or given by Nature as a "free good" (this does not apoly
to museums) , deliberate human action can either increase that capacity or
mitigate the quality impairment sterrming from any given level of socio-economic
interaction. Thus, low flow augmentation procedures can enhance -the waste
assimilative powers—the"capacitv"—of a river, or sewerage treatment Dlants
can decrease the extent to which any given flow of effluents overwhelms it.
Various forms of recycling affect air pollution, widening a highway affects
traffic flow, rationing devices influence the obstructiveness of a given
crowd in a swimming pool or museum.
This composite of public good sharing, and the policy variability of medium
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capacity and rate of interference by-product for each unit flow of interaction
is the basic characteristic of the generic "congestion" process which vte shall
treat. Under this broad head the more conventionally conceived "congestion"
and "pollution" take somewhat specialized forms.
!-Jhat distinguishes congestion from pollution in terms of the more
inclusive concept is chiefly the relationshir> among the generators and victims
of "interference". If highway traffic is the classic example of congestion,
then the central interpersonal distributive fact about it is that all users
are using the medium (the public good) in much the same way, each is damaging
service ouality for both others and himself, and the ratio of self* other damages
is approximately the same for all users. It would be difficult to separate
users into abusers and victims. Congestion is not looked on as a process in
which important real income redistribution occurs: some benefitting by imposing
damages upon others. The whole user group loses homogeneously by their self-
imposed interaction.
The essence of pollution, on the other hand, is that there are some
users who do abuse the medium—the polluters—whilf others are relatively passive
victims of such abuse—the "public". In these nrocesses users differ among
themselves in how they use the medium.. Some users emoloy rivers as sewers
for noxious materials, others—downstream—simply want to drink the water.
Some use the atmosphere similarly as a medium for noxious waste disposal, others
simply want to breaths it. Jet planes make the noise, housewives are forced
to submit to it. Thus, pollution often lends itself to a distinction between
destructive and constructive uses of a medium, botwsen guilty and innocent narties.
Significant—whether morally or in scope—income redistribution is a key asnect
of the process.
The legal and ethical characterization of the distinction are controversial.
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Is a pulp processor destructive because of v.hat he puts into the river, or
}>3cause of what other upstream users are putting in at the same time, or because
of wtiat a downstream user is baking out? If no other upstream discliarger
existed, or if there were no downstream user, his actions would hurt no one. Who has
property rights in the river? Is it a question of who came first? Even if it
were, this would not resolve the issue, s.ince it is not the sheer existence of
upstream and downstream users that causes the difficulty but the scale of
their interaction. Up to a certain scale upstream use causes no quality deter-
ioration. It is the marginal increment which crosses the tlireshold that becomes
noticed. But then the damage is produced by all the upstream users, not just
the marginal one. Can a destructive-non-destructive cichotcraization of uses
rest on scale considerations?
Economists like Coase and Buchanan have leaned on this kind of con-
sideration to argue an essential legal symmetry for different uses. They
accept any status quo pollution and suggest that it is ethically and alloca-
tionally equivalent whether victims offer payments to polluters to desist or
the state forces polluters to pay compensation to victims for the right to
continue. Cnly income distribution is affected.
One can recognize that real pollution depends on primacy, on scale of
polluter use, and on the presence and scale of victim use, without wishing to
abandon the distinction between destructive and non-destructive uses. At anv
time, given the contemporary context of the nature and volume of potential users
of a medium, some uses are at least potentially damaging to other conceivable
users. There is an important asyrrmetry between those who spew gases into
the air and those who only want to breathe it. The former do at least potential
ill to the latter, but the latter do not do damage to the former. If this kind
of assymetry be granted, then it is not the case that neutrality (symmetry) of
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property riqhts is allccatianally neutral. Far if external diseconomies
against others can be expected to lead to bribes by victims to desist, then
the production of negative externalities becomes a valid by-orcduct of primary
production. Profitability is enhanced whenever any finm can select from among
its input and/or output alternatives those T-^hich cause substantial damage
to third narties. Resource use will tend to became specialized toward much-
augmented third-party interference. The new legal industry of selling protection
against disturbance will be hiahly profitable. So long as the distinction
between negative and positive externalities is maintained, such an adaptation
of resource use must be deplored.
Our treatment of pollution does maintain tee distinction. Tnere is a
unique direction of service quality impairment, and sane uses involve a higher
rate of "potential impairment" tean others. Whether "potential impairment"
eventuates as actual impairment depends on concrete situations—tee scale
considerations
.
"Generic congestion" subsumes both customary congestion and pollution
as special cases of a general phenomenon: (1) pure congestion is tee case
where all users generate identical rates of quality interference per unit
of activity and share equally in the resulting qualitv imDairment; (2) pure
pollution is the case where seme users generate very high rates of per unit
interference whilfc others generate zero rates, and onlv the latter experience
quality impairment; (3) the general case is where all users both generate
impairment and share in it, but teev differ from one another in bote respects.
The variety of both abuse and victimization prevents an easv or complete cate-
gorization of users into guilty and innocent. Generic congestion, by enabling
us to study a multitude of patterns of relative generation and sharing of damages,
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can threw light on a greater range of allocational, distributional and public
policy issues than the customary congestion and pollution concepts. Indeed,
conventional terminology makes it difficult to understand most observable real-world
phenomena/ because it obtrudes extreme case insights into situations that typically
have elements of both extremes. Real world cases are neither pure congestion nor
pure pollution. Policy recortmendations based on these polar concepts are likely
to be deficient to the extent that they fail to take account of the mixed charac-
teristics.
In the remainder of the paper we shall briefly present a model of generic con-
gestion to give some idea of the facets which can be explored.
II. A Model of Generic Congestion
A. Preliminaries
In order to place the model in more than a partial equilibrium context we
assume that there are only two commodities in the system, X and Z. X is subject
to generic congestion but Z is not. The nature of the generic congestion is as
follows. Government provides a public good-type capacity from which it sells
shared services to the population. A variety of forms of crowding and interactive
interference characterize the actual consumption of these services. The population
contains three different types of users. All three share equally the results of
congestion, but they contribute to it unequally. There is a low polluter, a middle
polluter, and a high polluter group. Each generates a low, middle or high rate of
interference for every unit of X he consumes: groups L,low, L-middle, Lehigh; L eL.
member i of group j; the total population is divided among the groups in the fraction
n,, ru, n~ respectively.
While we have spoken about the consequences of congestion as quality impairment,
we shall facilitate the treatment by supposing that each user wishes to consume X
at a standard quality and must pay to have any quality damage offset. So the cost of
quality impairment to any individual is the amount he has to pay to undo the adverse
effects of congestion. Ihe greater the damage the greater must be the cost of offsetting
it.
B. Cost Functions
Commodity Z is produced under competitive conditions of constant costs.
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Since we shall speak about the cost to each L of consuming a standard quality of X,
i*=> sneak also of the cost to each L of consuming Z.
4.
z~
(1) C
1
= a Z. so C~
z 1 z
\\here C is the total cost to L of consuming Z. units of 7.
z 1
a is a constant
z . .
P is the price of Z
Ne treat Z as the numeraire aood. Therefore, let Pz = 1.
Commodity X is also produced under conditions of constant cost, but
congestion interferences add equal ly to the consumption costs for all L :
(2) C^=C
x
<X., Q)
where Cr is the total cost to L of consuming A. units of X
x •' 1
Q is the degree of generic congestion
(3) Q =
!T I L w. x.. =
*
j=lieL. 3 ^
where K is the quantity of the assimilating medium—the canacity
of the public good associated with , consumption of X
X . . is the amount of X consumed by L' eL
.
ji j
VI. is the interactive disturbance created by each unit of
-" consumption of X by any member of Lj
T is the total interactive disturbance by the whole population
(3) shows that the size of congestion externalities depend on (a) total X, (b)
the distribution of X among L. , L-, L- (c) the capacity of the assimilative
medium. Motice that each L adversely affects himself and others, the relative
amounts depending on his membership in one o:c the polluter groups.
i
, , . i
Some Properties of C and (we henceforth emit subscript X in C )
:
3C
1
is non-linear: (a) |~ = for Q<QQ , (b) ^ ZCX > for Q>QQ
>0 " Q>QQ
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where Q is the threshold value of Q beyond which congestion effects
occur
K can be influenoed by exj3lic.it public investment: social assimilation
investment: I (for example, highway width or qeneral sewerage treatment plants)
.
Where I = 0, K = K.j, the medium capacity given by nature (e.g. air and v;ater
as original "free goods", or unimproved earth surface for transr>ortation) . I
is shown as annual costs—as though they represent either a non-d\irable resource
use rerruiring annual replacement or the annual carrvinc charge of a durable
investment. By this treatment we can compare annual cost with the annual
value of the services rendered by the investment.
(4) K = % + K(I)
VJ. is the interactive distiirbance rate specific to each L.. Its value
can be affected, however, oy specific investments undertaken by the particular
-xillution grouns: group treatment investment: I.. These differ from social
assimilative investments in beina focused on the particular externalities
generated by each member of the group —e.g. like smoke or fluid effluent
recvcling by each plant—rather than beinci facilities tiaat deal with an agggregate
of interactive effects from various sources.
(5) Wj = W(j, Ij)
(a) Wi (l!=0) < W2 (I2=0)<W3 (I3=0)
^0(b) 3^, <0 (c) %R*
3
Group investment decreases its own rate of pollution , but this is a
decreasing effect. No I. totally wipes out W..
G. Demand Functions
In order to isolate congestion issues, we assume that all L have the
same income Y(t) and the same tastes for XandZ.Then, since every L e~L. has the
9.
same income, tastes and, by (3) , races the same cost of consumina X, X. . * X.
(where X. is per capita consuiiption of X in group L.). The demand for X ar*L Z. in
j. ares
•6) X. = X / Y_ / Pj\ or, since Pz=l, X.=X(Y, P.), V- 1 =
(7) Zj = Z/Y_ , Pj\ or Z
j
= Z(Y,P..)/l- • J )
2
where P is the market price of Z to everyone
P . is the market price of X to members of L
.
3
'
3
3X. „ 3Z. v n 3X. - . 3Z.
3 <o —2>° _1 > ° < _J_
^7 3P
j *? ^y
In the present model we shall subsequently examine the consequences
of having government impose a congestion charge on each group per unit of X
consumed by it. this congestion charge, ^ ., will be an amount necessary to
make the price facing each group equal the marginal resource cost to the
whole population resulting from that group's incremental consumption of X.
As explained below, it supplements the group's own cost with those overall
system costs resulting from its contribution to congestion and with whatever
group investments have been undertaken to decrease its congestion runnact.
j pT
(8) P. = C. + y.+I: where C. = C j
3
_i 3 J 3
~ J
X.
3
V = <5C . - £i-
3
*j fv •<!£;)
ax.
3
D. Total Demand; The Effect of Population Growth
rt
(9) L(t) = Lf where L(t) is the total population at time t
L is the initial population at time t
r° is the rate of growth.
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Since \<*2 assume the relative distribution among L.. , L^, L_ constant
and in fractions n, , n^ , n„
:
(10) N . (t) = n .L I
3 3 o
rt
j = 1,2,3. Enj = 1
j=i
Then the total demand for X by L. is:
Xji (t) =vtmj (t)(11) T.ieL.
]
And total X demanded at t:
N . (t) is the number of members
of L. at time t
3
(12) X(t) = I X (t)N (t)
j
J 3
Consequently T(t) is given by:
(13) T(t) = S W.X. (t)n.L i
rt
= L Jl
rt
I W.X. (t)n. Since X. (t)<X. (t ) only if
j 3 3 3 o o . 3 3 3 3 3 o'
T(t)>T(t ), then, as population increases over time so does total inter-
active disturbance and congestion: T(t) >0<Q(t) . (Of course, since as a result
prices rise, X rises slower tlian population growth alone would warrant.)
E. Total Demand: The Effect of Income Growth
As with population, let us examine the consequence of an upward drift
of per capita income.
(14) Y(t) = YQi
Yt (similar definitions as for (9) )
So X. is a function of tine because of both population and income growth.
Assuming W. = 0,
(15) T(t) = Z 3T 3X.
j 3X • 3t
3
(16) X.
3
= 3X.
3
3Y
Y + 3X.
37p"}_
P.
3
+ I 3T
5n.
X. tends to increase over time as per capita income rises, but tends
to decrease only as P. increases due to growing congestion. Thus, a fortiori,
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T(t)>0. Thus, Q(t)> also. As a result, X.(t) will ris^e also, but due
to the gracing congestion, will rise slower tlian warranted by tie nure iaccme
effect, especially as congestion becomes more and mate serious.
This indicates that a system which l^egins with ro congestion problem
—
with air and water and beaches uncongested, unpolluted "free goods"—will
gradually move toward greater and greater congestion of all such natural
media by the sheer gro\irth and affluence of the society, especially when
these occur in a context of greater spatial concentrations (urbanization)
(since such growing concentration increases each W. as it increases inter-
dependence) . Tine problem creeps ud on the society that is doing nothing
differently, only more and better—creeps, and then gallops.
F. Optimal Resource Allocation between X and Z
1. Optimal Conditions in Exchange and Production
icL
Far each L Jj, an optimal budgetary allocation between X and Z requires:
(17)
MRS", or P. = MRSJ. = lyf""1 — " — »«^->"-'"
P
2 3
. .
where MRS is L 's marginal rate of substitution between X and Z.
For all i, k, optimal production-consumption allocation requires:
(18) MRS
1
= MRSk = MC MC
x = x
MC a
2
(since average cost of 7, is an invariant a, so too is marginal cost)
C is tiie marginal cost of consuming X(at standard quality)* In our model
this includes the various disposal, gueueing and other interactive interference
procedures that characterize congestion. The extent of these procedures
determines the terms an which everybody can enjoy his own X, since is lielps
determine C .
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But these term's depend on \<fcio gets the additional (marginal) X. The three
pollution groups differ in their efficiency in handling X. Group L. is the
most efficient, L^ next and L, least: 5C,<5C^5C_. If all groups face the
sane price for X, intra-industry optimalitv reguires that all of it go to L.
,
and none to L^ or L...
2. Efficiency under Zero Congestion Oiarges
Assume that Y . = 0, for all j. Then there is a high probabilitv that
no group will find it uorthwhile to make a group treatment investment. Since
most of the impact of each qroup's interactive disturbance is on otheri rather
than on itself, any such investment largely benefits those others. Profitability
for self-interest v.fuld require that a very small portion of the project'-s overall
benefits be large enough to exceed the whole cost of the investment. Benefit to
the investor from such a project is given as:
3c1 / ZL x
n
j - $r = i 3Q j
3C
W. 3X.
l - "5Q- "j "j_
K X.
1 (%)
Benefits to the population as a whole is given as:
(20) IT. = L 2
rt
TT
1DO d
Kith this disparity it is most doubtful that there exists an I . such that
n
1
>I1 . Thus, with ¥. = we can exoect also that I. = for all j.j- D D " D
If this is so, then all individuals face the same P. = XT. Consequently,
all have the same incentive to consume any marginal resource transfer from Z
—
i.e., all will bid egually to consume an extra unit of X. As a result, any
marginal resources flaving to X are likely to be divided among tiie tfiree groups
in the same proportions as their percentage of the population: n,, n^, n~. So the
average of the marginal costs of consuming X that follov7s a marginal resource transfer
13.
E SC^"
frcm Z is I n.6C, which exceeds min (6C.,SC , 5C_) (where 5C . = , *~— ).
]
-
3
This has two implications.
First, it means that whatever resources flow from Z to X are inefficiently
distributed within X (as noted in the last section) . Members of L_ and L_
consume too much relative to L.. .Second, when L experiences incremental
consumption he pavs 9C (marcrinal private cost) . But his extra consumption
^i Jc
adds to everyone else's cost as well: k^.i (i.e. marginal social cost less
1
9C
1
) . Thus, the marginal social cost substantially exceeds the marginal private
cost: ^C . > «- 3 . Consequently, resource flow betoken Z and X is determined
3
J
by an aggregate demand for X which is systematically biased upward above the
socially optimal amount, because each buyer faces a price lower than the marginal
social cost of supplying it. Too much X is consulted, too little Z.
Cptimal allocation would be arrived at where each L Jj were faced with
the true AC. as his cost of consuming extra X. Then members of L., L„ and L-,
faced with differentially liiglier prices of X in the sane order, would cut
their consumption differentially in that order. The lesser per capita consumption
in L9 and L^ relative to L, would be determined at those ooints where the
resulting higher marginal valuation of X equalled the differentially hiqher prices.
By comparison, the suboptiroal situation shows that there is both a
distributional and an allccational distortion. The distribution issue under-
scores what might be called the customary pollution aspect: heavy polluters
making too much use of a scarce medium relative to light polluters (or victims)
.
Tic allccational issue underscores the custernary congestion aspect: everyone's
activity damaging tlie quality of others' and his own prospects.
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3. Congestion Charges
Let us now examine the consequences of having the government impose
congestion charges on everyone so that each L pay a price for consumption of X
which reflects the true marginal social cost of that consumption. The total
revenues collected are subsequently redistributed equally among the same L1
.
'- ursce each L. is homogeneous, charges will differ only with respect to group.
3
i C
'Xhe charge HI . is set so that each L pays P . = — + Y . + I . and
1
^*
J
x",
J 3
(21) v. = &c. - — - z w. ac* c
1
,,. /ox , ,,, .j 3 jj k A -Jq (from (2) and (3) )
The result of this has been discussed in the last section. Every L1 faces the
true marginal social cost of his consumption of X. His relative demand between
X and Z is undistorted. So aggregate demand for X is undistorted. Less X will
be consumed, more Z, and the distribution of X will show X.>5L>X,, because, by (21)
,
P,<P
2
<P
3 .
Since generic congestion in our model is shared equally by all, the
relative price changes among L. , L_ and L_ result in a real income redistribution.
All are benefitted by an increase in Z and a decrease in congestion cost associated
with the total consumption of X. But L_ pays most per capita for these benefits
in its members 1 sacrifice of X consumption, L~ pays next most, and L. least,
for the same benefits. At the least there is a change in relative income
distribution. But there is likely to be an absolute change too. Members of L3
may actually be worse off after the resource shift than before, since they pay much
mare in charges than they receive in per capita refund. Members of L^ may gain or
lose on balance from the shift, but probably not by much in either direction
(depending, of course, on the technological, taste and relative numbers characteristics
of the actual situation) . If per capita refund is nearly as great as their average
charge, they will gain because of the lower congestion cost in X. Member of L1
probably gain substantially—both because of a refund which greatly exceeds the charge,
and because of the lessened congestion in X: gains which, by the Compensation Principle,
are more than sufficient to make it possible to pay off the losers to make them no
worse off than before. Congestion charges damage the "polluters" and help the "victims",
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G. Grouo Treatment Investment
IVhen ¥ . = for all there is little incentive for individuals to under-
take group treatment investment to lessen the externality effect of their
consumption. All I
.
is likely to be zero. But imposition of congestion charaes
changes this. ¥. is a positive function of W. (by (21) ), and the size of W.
can be decreased by such investments. Y. and I. are substitute outlays, then,
and each individual will undertake such investment as decreases ¥ . bv more
3
than the cost of the investment. In effect, he determines his optiinal I . by
minimizing P . with respect to I
.
. I . represents a "treatment cost" per
unit of X consumed by each member of L
.
. So it enters the unit price of X
facing each such member:
(22) P . = <fc .+1
.
3 3 3
.A
The condition for the optimal I . is therefore given as
:
,„> 1 l SC^ dW. , dW. h
(23)
-K-k-^T^ = "lor —L = - T*?fa
j dl. k 90J
3
rA\e left-hand term in the first version represents the impact on marginal
social costs of a marginal investment. Investment is more favored the hiqher
its impact on W
.
, the more strongly increments in congestion increase the
necessary offset costs to achieve standard consumption quality, the larger
the overall population, or the lesser the assimilative capacity of the
coirmon medium. Tiie first is a technological consideration. The others
essentially denote the several elements comprising the seriousness of the
congestion problem. Investment is favored the more serious is current
congestion and the more effectively it can decrease the per unit contributions
to that condition. It should be noted that each I. is a. substitute for the
3
only other policy variable implied in (23) , I (social assimilation investment)
,
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since the latter increases K and therefore decreases the payoff to each I..
Ihe only term which can reveal which groups are likely to invest
is dW. This is subject to technological possibilities. We may surmise,
however, sons properties of the relationship. The larger is W. the easier
it probably is to effect a unit decrease in it, since critical mass phenomena
may make several types of recycling economical or may make available a greater
variety of ameliorative procedures. Thus, we assume
(24)
dJ_ > fk if W (Ij=0)>^(Ik=0)
^i I Vo **
Since W_> W
?
>W., this suggests that greater polluters are more likely to
substitute treatment investment for congestion penalties than lesser polluters.
It is even conceivable that the treatment will be carried far enough to wipe
out the difference in observed W. betwaen two adjacent groups (the group
will, howsver, remain distinct because the originally higher group:
will have achieved the lower W . only by a greater I . than that of the lower
grouo) . Whatever the actual oattem of I . among groups , the presence of the
congestion charges (in the context of equal incomes, tastes and congestion
sharing) will guarantee that the total resources spent on treatment will
be efficiently spent: it will buy the largest total decrease in congestion
cost for the population : i.e.
(25) E 36C
j dl. N. - Zdl.N. =JI(I* \ . v ^ „ *
1 STT 3 1 j 3 3 \ j.) mas far £r dl . N. =1
3
J \ 3 1 3
J J
3
*
where H. (I_ ) is the aggregate cost improvement resulting from a given total of
3
j
*
E
. in resources being used for I . by individual users as part of their utility
maximizing decisions, less the amount I_ : i.e., an aggregate private investment
1j
profit.
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H. Social Assimilation Investment
Social assimilation investment (I), unlike the private projects of I.,
is carried out bv the collectivitv of L—the crovernment. Tt decreases the
overall system costs of congestion by increasing the assimilative capacity
of the common medium which is shared by users of X. Multiple user treatment
plants, road capacity enlargment, low flav augmentation, are examnles of this
type of investment. We have already noted that I is a substitute for I
.
. It
is also a substitute for more production of X or Z. Its justification therefore
depends upon traditional cost-benefit analysis. This consists in comparing
the aggregate cost savings from decreased congestion less the loss of net
cost saving from private treatment investment that is nrecluded by the public
investment—the project's benefits—with the project's costs (i.e., the
opportunity cost in terms of Z) . The marginal profit from an increment of such
investment is:
(26) 3H
3T k - U&4
31 3 1
-1=-T dK 3 £ d*
~2 ar I -
3(nj
*
-l
3 Q ar-
The second term is complex, since it shows the effect of a changing K on the
cost impact of each marginal I., and the effect of this on the optimal I..
It is therefore difficult to characterize the properties of 3TT in general.
lore precise specification of the components is necessary for deeper analysis.
With a precise specification we can, by setting — = 0, find the optimal I—I —
and for each user thereby, the optimal set of private investments, I,» I
2 ,
I_.
This in turn establishes the set (W.) and so the set (¥.). All of thesey y
together determine the marginal social costs for different users of X, and for
X as a whole relative to Z. Thus, the overall allocation of resources and
distribution of income are determined.
The most obvious qualitative result suggested by (23 J and (26) is an asymmetry
between I and the set (I.). Ihe former is, but the latter are not, a positive function
18.
of T (aggregate interactive disturbance) . Since T (t) > , then we can expect
also (27) l(t)>0
I will be increasingly justified by population grid income growth. The pro-
fitability of each I . will not be directly enhanced by a growing T, but to
whatever extent this growth in T stems fran population growth there will
be more total users , each one of whom has an unclianged incentive for I
.
.
However, the growing I and thereby the ever-increasing K will systematically
decrease the attractiveness of private treatment expenditures . Growth may
veil tend to favor a gradual switch from private to public investment, assuming
that decreasina returns to I (i.e., the size of dX) do not set in substantially.
dT
vJiat could mitigate this trend is for incremental public investment to have
so disastrous an effect upon the profitability of private investment that
benefit-cost considerations justify only small increases relative to population
growth (which tends to increase T.I.U.—total private investment). But pre-
j 1 D
cise characteristics of (26) and the set (23) are necessary to determine this.
One subsidiary result is that public investment, unlike private, does
not require the presence of congestion charges to justify its existence. As
with the latter, the presence of charges affects the opportunity costs of
undertaking investment. But the direction of effect is reversed. Congestion
charges, by making private investment attractive, make the opportunity cost
of public investment higher, because public investment tends to displace private.
In the absence of charges there would be no private investment and, therefore,
none to be displaced by public. Public investment would be considerably
larger. The resulting intensity of congestion is difficult to compare under
the two situations. It will generally depend on the effectiveness of individuals
vs. multi-user methods of controlling congestion. A rough guess is that some
forms of congestion are easier to control individually than collective lv, so the
situation that can find room for both—i.e. with charges — will use resources
mare efficiently in this regard.
19.
I. Conclusion
Only the briefest conclusion can be given here. A system with con-
gestion charges will differ from one without in a variety of dimensions.
Relative prices between X and Z, and among different users, will be affected.
But so too will be the amount of private and public investment to control
congestion. Wnilc no definitive propositions can be made at this level of
generality once the complex interaction of all these dimensions is allowed,
the no-charge system is likely to display the following characteristics
relative to the more efficient charge system:
(1) too much consumption of X relative to Z;
(2) too much consumption of X by L especially and L_ relative to L. ;
(3) not enough private investment and hence too high congestion
generation rates per unit of private activity;
(4) too much relative dependence on public investment to carry the
burden of control against a growing congestion problem;
(5) in sum, more congestion at any time, and a more rapid worsening
of the problem over time.
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